Abstract
Introduction
The encryption and digital signature are two fundamental cryptographic mechanisms that can provide the security of communications. Until the before decade, they have been viewed as important but distinct building blocks of various cryptographic systems. In the public key schemes, a traditional method is to digitally sign a message then followed by an encryption (signature-then-encryption) that can have two problems: Low efficiency and high cost of such summation, and the case that any arbitrary scheme cannot guarantee the security. The signcryption is a relatively new cryptographic technique that is supposed to fulfill the functionalities of digital signature and encryption in a single logical step. It effectively decreases the computational costs and communication overheads in comparison with the traditional signaturethen-encryption schemes. The first signcryption scheme was introduced by Zheng (1997) but it fails the forward secrecy of message confidentiality (Jung et al. 2001 ). Zheng also proposed an elliptic curve-based signcryption scheme that saves 58% of computational and 40% of communication costs when compared with the traditional elliptic curve-based signature-thenencryption schemes (Zheng and Imai, 1998) . Several signcryption schemes are also proposed over the years, each of them providing different level of security services and computational costs. The correctness, efficiency, and security are the essential attributes that any signcryption scheme should take them into account. A signcryption scheme should simultaneously fulfill the security attributes of an encryption and those of a digital signature. Such properties mainly include: Confidentiality, Unforgeability, Integrity, and Nonrepudiation. Some signcryption schemes provide further attributes such as Public verifiability and Forward secrecy of message confidentiality while the others do not provide them. The public verifiability may not be required in some applications while forward secrecy of message confidentiality has an increasingly significance especially when the signcryption is to be done on poorly protected devices such as mobile phones. For the case of brevity, we do not describe the mentioned attributes since they can be easily found in the corresponding literature such as (Tso et al., 2007) .
Currently, the elliptic curve cryptography is being used in a wide variety of applications. The elliptic curvebased systems can attain to a desired security level with significantly smaller keys than those of required for their counterparts. This can enhance the speed and leads to an efficient use of power, bandwidth, and storage that are the basic limitations of resource-constrained devices. The Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) (Hankerson et al., 2004 ) that can be a computationally infeasible problem has an essential role in the elliptic curve-based approaches.
In this paper, a new elliptic curve-based signcryption scheme is introduced that simultaneously provides the attributes of message confidentiality, authentication, integrity, unforgeability, non-repudiation, public verifiability, and forward secrecy of message confidentiality. It is an authenticated scheme since it deploys an implicit authenticated key establishment.
The Proposed Scheme
Throughout this paper, Alice is the sender, Bob is the recipient, and Mallory is the malicious active attacker. Our proposed signcryption scheme is depicted in Figure  1 where some of its deployed notations are described in Figure 2 . It consists of four phases: Initialization, Signcryption, Unsigncryption, and Judge Verification. The initialization phase includes selecting the domain parameters, generating the private/public keys, and getting a certificate for the public key of each user. In signcryption phase, Alice signcrypts her message and sends it to Bob. In unsigncryption phase, Bob performs the unsigncryption to recover the signcrypted text and verify the signature. The judge verification phase is used only when any dispute occurs in which the judge decides whether Alice has sent the signcrypted message to Bob or not. 
Initialization
Domain parameters of the proposed scheme consist of a suitably selected elliptic curve E defined over a finite field q F with the Weierstrass equation of the form
, and a base point
q is a large prime number. In order to make the elliptic curve non-singular, for all
suffices in practice), q n  should be satisfied, and the curve should be non-supersingular (Law et al., 2003) . In order to keep the intractability of ECDLP to the Pollard-rho and Pohlig-Hellman algorithms (Stinson, 2006) , n should at least satisfy 160 2  n for the common applications. NIST has also specified the minimum bit lengths of elliptic curves' domain parameters for different required level of security (NIST, 2007 
order to thwart the invalid-curve attack (Hankerson et al., 2004) . The point R acts as an ephemeral public key while r is the corresponding ephemeral private key. The validity verification of such ephemeral public key mainly includes checking the following conditions (Antipa et al., 2003) : Here, the unsigncryption will be terminated with failure if any of the above-mentioned conditions fails.
Judge Verification
When Bob claims that he has received the signcrypted text ) , , ( to Bob.
Several precautions should be taken into account in implementation of the proposed scheme. It is strongly recommended to use a strong block cipher (such as AES) for encrypting messages. The generated random numbers and also the state of pseudo-random generators should be erased from the memory as soon as the signature is generated. Using the predefined pairs of ) , ( R r and saving them in an insecure storage media is not recommended. The private keys should be stored in a secure storage media such as a Hardware Security Module (HSM).
Although it is not recommended, the first step of the signcryption and unsigncryption phases may be simplified after the first run of the protocol. Alice and Bob may save the trusted public key of the other party for the future uses. However, it is still necessary for Bob to check the revocation status of the Alice's certificate. The revocation status can be obtained using either of Certificate Revocation List (CRL), Delta CRL, or Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP). The OCSP (Myers et al. 1999 ) is the most profitable solution for the resource-constrained devices that cannot save a too large CRL, and whenever the timely information is necessary, e.g. in the funds transferring. The OCSP responses are digitally signed with a private key that its corresponding trusted public key is known to the participants. The OCSP server may query its required information from a database server. The certificates are usually stored in an LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access Protocol) directory (Zeilenga, 2006) . For the resource-constrained environments, delegating the validity verifications to a trusted server will improve the performance. The verification authority and hash chain can also be used for simplifying the certificate validations (Satizabál, 2007) .
Fig.3. A typical configuration for the proposed scheme
The correctness of the proposed scheme can be simply verified. Alice and Bob will reach to the same point K on the elliptic curve since:
Subsequently, both of participants calculate the same session key as ) || || || (
correctly decrypts the signcrypted text and verifies the signature.
Defining R x as the least significant half in binary representation of R x is just a trade-off between security and efficiency. This corresponds with the NIST specifications (NIST, 2007) . Let c denotes the bit length of R x . The smaller the c the less required number of operations will be, and the efficiency will be subsequently improved. However, a too small c may decrease the security. For a similar case, Krawczyk has
shown that choosing c so that f c  2 does not increase the security (Krawczyk, 2005) . If L denotes a point of elliptic curve and  is a positive integer, (Wagstaff, 2003) . As an example, the required number of operations for calculating (Toorani and Beheshti Shirazi, 2010) b See (Toorani and Beheshti Shirazi, 2008) 
On the Security of the Proposed Scheme
The proposed scheme provides a wide variety of security attributes as it is depicted in Table 1 . The longterm private key of Alice is involved in the session key generation so the session key has resilience to disclosure of secret value r. Validity verification of the static and ephemeral public keys, and the certificates are carefully considered so several kinds of attacks are thwarted. The proposed scheme gets its security from several components:
1) The security attributes of the session key establishment, 2) The security attributes of the certificates, 3) The security attributes of deployed block cipher, one-way hash function, and HMAC, 4) Intractability of ECDLP due to the selected domain parameters.
The proposed scheme deploys a strong key establishment. Until now, many authenticated key exchange protocols are introduced, each of them having their own problems and limitations. The MQV protocols (Law et al., 2003) are possibly the most efficient of all known authenticated Diffie-Hellman protocols that use public-key authentication. The MQV has been widely standardized, and has been selected by the NSA to protect the classified information of USA government. Although HMQV (Krawczyk, 2005) tries to thwart the MQV's vulnerabilities by basically introducing an additional hash function, it also has several vulnerabilities (Menezes, 2005. Menezes and Ustaoglu, 2006) . The elliptic curve-based session key establishment process of the proposed scheme does not exactly correspond with that of (Law et al., 2003) and (Krawczyk, 2005) , but it tries to improve and match such ideas for its own case. The session key establishment part of the proposed scheme has itself the following security attributes:
1. Known session key security: Each execution of the protocol results in a unique session key. The session key will differ for different sessions because the ephemeral random number r is introduced in the session key establishment process so the compromise of one session key does not compromise the keys of the other sessions. Since the private keys and identifiers of both participants are involved in the session key derivation function, it will differ even if Alice uses the same random number r for signcrypting the same message for different recipients.
Resilience to the Unknown-Key Share attack:
In an UKS attack (Kaliski, 2001) 
Partial Forward secrecy:
A system has the attribute of partial forward secrecy if compromising the longterm private key of one entity (or more but not all the entities) does not compromise the previously established session keys. In the proposed scheme, even if A w is revealed, the attacker should have the value of the corresponding r that is generally in deposit of solving the ECDLP.
As it is indicated in Table 1 , the proposed scheme provides many attributes. Hereunder, a brief proof is given for the claimed attributes.
1) Confidentiality:
The proposed scheme deploys a strong block cipher so according to the Kerckhoffs' principle, the secrecy will be entirely resided in the established session keys. The session key establishment process has itself several security attributes. Ultimately, an adversary has only two ways to defeat the confidentiality: having B w , or deriving both A w and r.
Deriving the private keys and finding the corresponding r of a specific R is in deposit of solving the ECDLP that is computationally infeasible with the selected domain parameters. If B w is revealed, the attacker can only decrypt those ciphertexts that are signcrypted by B W .
This is an inevitable feature of all the one-pass protocols with implicit authenticated key exchange. However, for a definite sender, the attacker should have both A w and the corresponding r of the clearly sent R.
Otherwise, he cannot derive the true session key and the decryption will be computationally infeasible. It is noteworthy that the proposed scheme does not have the feature of past recovery so Alice cannot retrieve her previously signcrypted texts without having the corresponding r of R. Compromising the past recovery is a common feature of all the forward secure systems.
2) Authentication: The implicit authentication is provided in three ways: the proposed scheme is certificate-based and the certificates are verified by both sender and recipient. An implicit authentication is also involved in the session key establishment so only the correct party who has the true private key can reach to the correct key agreement and perform the unsigncryption. An authentication is also accomplished when Bob verifies the signature by checking the it is necessary to have the value of random number r for the corresponding session. Otherwise, the ephemeral session key cannot be recovered. Generally, the forward secrecy will be compromised only if the attacker can solve the ECDLP that is computationally infeasible with the selected domain parameters. As a one-pass protocol, since there is not any session-specific input from Bob, we cannot prospect the proposed scheme for the Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS). However, the proposed scheme provides the partial forward secrecy under intractability of the ECDLP.
Computational Costs
In this section, the time complexity of the proposed scheme is evaluated. Table 2 gives a comparison between the computational costs of the proposed scheme and those of the other schemes, in which the computational costs of verifications and symmetric encryption are neglected. Since different schemes provide different number of security attributes, it is necessary to take a glimpse at the provided security attributes in Table 1 before comparing the computational costs of different schemes in Table 2 . In Table 2 , the computational costs are categorized with respect to different kinds of required operations, each of them requiring a different number of bit operations. The total running time of a signcryption scheme depends on the efficiency of deployed algorithm for each of required operations (hardware-independent), and the speed of deployed hardware (hardware-dependent).
denotes the bit-length of the modulus n. Since n is an odd prime number, the resulted calculations in the modular arithmetic have at most a bit-length of  . Adding and subtracting two ζ-bit integers each takes ) ( O bit operations (Rosen, 1988) so we have:
Multiplying two ζ-bit integers, and dividing a 2ζ-bit dividend by a ζ-bit divisor takes ) ( 2  O bit operations using the conventional method (Rosen, 1988) . Thus,
) (
However, one can multiply and divide faster than what is specified by the conventional methods, e.g. a divideand-conquer algorithm due to Karatsuba and Ofman reduces the complexity of multiplication to ) ( Hankerson et al., 2004) . There is also a fast algorithm for multiplying two ζ-bit integers in ) log log log (
bit operations but it is not so useful 
unless  is very large (Wagstaff, 2003) . However, for having a fair comparison between the computational costs of different schemes, it is reasonable to just consider what is required by the conventional methods since such results are the results of the worst situation and anyone can decrease the required number of bit operations by deploying faster algorithms. For the modular inverse calculation using the conventional method, we have (Rosen, 1988) :
The running time of the modular exponentiation using the conventional methods will be of (Rosen, 1988) :
The HMAC executes in approximately the same time as its embedded hash function for long messages but its running time depends on the kind of its embedded hash function. Total number of operations for the HMAC-SHA1 calculations (Elkeelany et al., 2002) is as:
While for the case of HMAC-MD5, it is:
In which 512
is the number of input blocks to the embedded hash function where N is the bit-length of the total message, and k is the bit-length of extraappended inner form of the key (Elkeelany et al., 2002) .
The computations in elliptic curves depend on many factors including the deployed coordinates. The computational cost of an Elliptic Curve Point Addition (ECPA) in an Affine coordinate is as:
While for the Jacobian projective coordinate, we have:
The Elliptic Curve Point Multiplication (ECPM) is a basic and time-consuming operation in ECC. The execution times of the EC-based schemes are typically dominated by the point multiplication. It typically takes ) (log k O group operations to compute kP when 0  k (Wagstaff, 2003) . Several methods for the scalar multiplication are proposed in the literature. However, selecting the suitable algorithm is complicated by platform characteristics, coordinate selection, memory and other constraints, security considerations, and interoperability requirements (Hankerson et al., 2004 (NIST, 2000) , the total required number of field operations for a point multiplication for an unknown point using the Window NAF method on JacobianChudnovsky coordinate is calculated in (Hankerson et al., 2004) as:
Chudnovsky -Jacobian (11) However, for a fixed point P, using offline precomputations and Comb 2-table method in JacobianAffine coordinate, it can be calculated as (Hankerson et al., 2004) :
Affine -Jacobian (12) that is explicitly less than what is specified in (11). For other curves, coordinates and algorithms, the required number of operations will differ from what is specified in (11) and (12). The computational costs of the proposed scheme and those of the other schemes can be fairly compared using Table 2 and expressions (2-11). Figure 4 depicts the total required number of bit operations for executing signcryption and unsigncryption in the signcryption schemes that are described in Table 2 , in which the computational costs of verifications and symmetric encryption are neglected. As it is apparent from Figure 4 , the computational costs of our proposed scheme in unsigncryption phase is slightly more than the other depicted EC-based schemes, as it provides the most feasible security attributes, but it has a great computational advantage over its exponentiation-based counterparts. 
Optional Improvements
In this section, some improvements are introduced to the proposed scheme. They are considered as optional improvements since they may not be required in some applications and systems.
Delegating verifications to a trusted server
When the participants are dealing with processing and memory constraints, delegating the validity verifications to a trusted server will offer significant advantages. The required time of sending a certificate to a validation server and subsequently, receiving and authenticating the response can be considerably less than the required time of performing the certificate path discovery and validation by a resource-constrained device. The performance of the proposed scheme can be greatly enhanced by delegating the validation processes to a Delegated Validation (DV) server, as it is depicted in Figure 5 . The DV server can be independent of the communication network. It accomplishes the certificate validation via the Delegated Path Validation (DPV) protocol but its duties defers from what is specified in (Pinkas and Housley, 2002) . All the signcrypted texts will be directed to the DV server through the communication network. The DV server accomplishes the certificate and public key validations for both sender and recipient. It queries the database server for the certificates of both sender and recipient through their identifiers. It obtains the revocation statuses by getting OCSP responses from the OCSP server. It also checks the validity of point R. The DV server will contact the designated recipient after a successful validation. If any error occurs, the DV server will send an error message to the initiator and saves a copy in its log file. According to the security policies, all the transmitted messages may be separately saved by the DV server for the possible disputes. The DV server digitally signs its responses, unless an error is occurred. The signed responses should include a hash value of all the transmitted parameters in addition to the identifiers of both sender and recipient.
In the optimized configuration, Bob will not check the validity of point R because it is validated by the DV server. He just checks the DV server's signature. in which  is the acceptable time window that is determined by estimating the usual delay time between sending and receiving of a message in the deployed communication link. Hereby, Bob can easily neglect the old messages. This can simply thwart the potential replay attacks. Using timestamps, the deployed encryption and signature generation functions will be time-dependent and the freshness of messages will be enhanced. The timestamp can also be used as a parameter in the seed of random number generators. However, exploiting timestamps has its own problems (e.g. the synchronization) and cannot be deployed in some systems.
Towards directly public verification
In the proposed scheme, the signature can be verified by any third party provided that 
Conclusions
In this paper, a new elliptic curve-based signcryption scheme is introduced that simultaneously provides the security attributes of message confidentiality, authentication, integrity, unforgeability, and nonrepudiation. It also has the attribute of public verifiability so any third party can verify the signature without any need for the private keys of the participants. It also has the attribute of forward secrecy of message confidentiality so even if the sender's private key is revealed, no one else can extract the plaintext of the previously signcrypted texts. Since it is based on elliptic curve cryptography and uses symmetric ciphering for encrypting messages, it has great advantages to be deployed in resource-constrained devices such as mobile phones. As a one-pass scheme, it is also so attractive for security establishment in storeand-forward applications such as E-mail and Short Message Service.
